

BUSINESS & MARKET DUE-DILIGENCE

The Cancelled Share

A Samsung-anchored module maker reallocating to capital return into a profit trough — with automotive-camera growth, and succession, the unwritten drivers.

KOSDAQ 091700 · Partron Co., Ltd.

A flat, concentrated component franchise being financially re-rated and dynastically re-positioned faster than it is being operationally transformed.

FY2025 revenue	Operating margin	Samsung share of revenue	Q1-2026 revenue YoY
₩1,349.5bn	3.3%	71.2%	+37.5%

Prepared for a consulting firm supporting M&A / investment due-diligence on Partron and the Korean camera-and-sensor module sector. This is a business-analysis and market-research brief, not an equity research note: it carries no price target and treats sell-side targets only as third-party sentiment.

Evidence base · DART Annual Report FY2025 (rcept 20260311004362, filed 2026-03-11) + 5-yr structured consolidated financials, Q1-2026 report (20260515001472), capital-reduction filing (20260225004109); KRX by_company/partron 1-yr panel; SEC EDGAR (Franklin Wireless); and adversarially-verified market research. Figures cited inline to source. · Seoul · 2026-06-16

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EIGHT SECTIONS · ~31 PAGES

The monograph is built around a single analytical spine — a **bifurcated component franchise**: a flat, Samsung-concentrated mobile-camera cash leg versus a small, fast-compounding automotive-camera growth leg, being **financially re-rated and dynastically re-positioned** through a buyback-and-cancel program faster than it is being operationally transformed. Every section — history, products, market, competition, and the strategic signal — is read through that lens.

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
HOW TO READ THIS DOCUMENT

The number that frames everything is not the FY2025 revenue, nor the Q1-2026 rebound — it is the **cancelled share**. Partron retired 8.9 million shares of its own stock into a five-year-low margin, and is pulling its share count below 50 million a year ahead of plan. The thesis of this report is that the capital-return program is the most durable part of the equity story precisely because it doubles as a **founder-succession instrument** — and that the operating transformation it is funding is real, but narrower and slower than the headline target implies.

Executive Summary

Partron Co. (KOSDAQ 091700) is a twenty-year Samsung-ecosystem electronic-component maker whose franchise has quietly **bifurcated**. A large, structurally flat-to-shrinking mobile-camera and sensor cash leg — Samsung is **71.2% of FY2025 revenue** DART 20260311004362 — sits beside a small, fast-compounding automotive-camera growth leg, where Hyundai Mobis revenue rose +54% to ₩155.5bn and automotive parts grew +24.8% to ₩209.4bn, the only growing product line in the company. Over five years revenue went nowhere — ₩1,312.7bn in FY2021 to ₩1,349.5bn in FY2025, with the FY2024 cyclical peak at ₩1,486.4bn — and FY2025 margins compressed to a five-year-low **3.3% operating margin**.

Exhibit 1 · Five years of flat revenue and a margin that has only fallen — to a 3.3% trough in FY2025



Source: DART 20260311004362 (Annual Report FY2025), 5-yr consolidated financials (fnlTtSinglAcntAll CFS). OP margin on right-hand 0–8% scale.

Against that operating backdrop, management is running the dominant strategic signal: an aggressive, *accelerated* capital-return program — twin treasury-stock cancellations plus a 5.0-million-share capital reduction that pulls issued shares below 50 million a year early, a ~4% dividend yield, and a marketed ≥6%/year shareholder return — executed deliberately *into* the earnings trough DART 20260225004109. The Q1-2026 inflection (revenue ₩451.0bn, +37.5% YoY; operating profit ×1.9) validates the operating-leverage case off idle capacity — but it is handset-cycle-driven, so it funds and de-risks the buyback story without yet proving the diversification story.

THE ONE-SENTENCE THESIS

Partron is a flat, concentrated component business being **financially re-rated and dynastically re-positioned faster than it is being operationally transformed**: a Samsung-anchored mobile cash leg in slow share-give, a fast-growing but small automotive leg, and a buyback-and-cancel Value-Up program that doubles as a founder-succession instrument — the most durable part of the story, because the controlling family's incentive reinforces it.

Five findings a diligence team should anchor on

- 1 The franchise is bifurcated, and only one leg grows.** Mobile parts fell -14.5% to ₩737.7bn in FY2025 while automotive parts rose +24.8% to ₩209.4bn — the single growing line, gaining share ~3-4× its end-market's rate off a low base DART 20260311004362. The company is now 67% a camera-module maker, re-weighting from a share-losing mobile leg toward a share-gaining automotive one.
- 2 Concentration is the core risk and it has barely moved.** Samsung is 71.2% and the top-two customers ~83% of revenue; the equity is a levered call on the Galaxy camera-module cycle, and Q1-2025 showed allocation can shift to a rival overnight — MCNEX overtook Partron on quarterly revenue for the first time in five years DART 20260311004362; TheElec.
- 3 The margin is structurally capped.** Partron is a module integrator that owns neither the lens, the flagship zoom, nor the image sensor — so a 3.3% operating margin is a structural ceiling, not a cyclical dip, with disclosed ASP erosion of 3-5% per quarter DART 20260311004362.
- 4 The dominant signal is capital allocation, not operations.** Twin treasury cancellations plus a 5.0M-share capital reduction pulled issued shares below 50M a year early — executed *into* the margin trough — alongside a ~4% yield and a marketed ≥6%/yr return DART 20260225004109.
- 5 The buyback doubles as a succession instrument.** Cancelling treasury stock lifts the founder family's voting power toward ~30% without a purchase, ahead of an unresolved transfer — founder 76, heir ~1.9%, >₩440bn inheritance-tax overhang — which is why it is durable and accelerated Governance Watch.

Verdict for the brief. Partron is a structurally sound, net-cash, diversified Samsung-ecosystem module maker that is neither growing nor failing — it is **re-mixing**. The question is not whether the engine is durable (the financials settle that) but whether the **automotive leg scales before the next handset down-cycle**, and how the **founder's succession** resolves control of the cash flows underneath.

1 Company & Business Model

THE MODULE ENGINE


Partron was founded in **2003**, when Kim Jong-gu carved Samsung Electro-Mechanics' RF and handset-parts business out into an independent company with ₩27.1bn of capital; it is headquartered in Dongtan, Hwaseong, Gyeonggi DART 20260311004362; Business Post. It designs and mass-produces three product families through three divisions, and its economics are defined less by what the parts do than by how thin the margin on them is.

Three divisions, one customer concentration

- ▶ **Optomechanical Division** — camera modules, actuators, lenses and motors, with the optical sub-components built in-house. 67.0% of FY2025 sales and rising; this is now the centre of gravity.
- ▶ **Sensor & Package Division** — fingerprint, heart-rate and IR-temperature sensors, touch-pad / SiP modules and LED. 23.4% of sales.
- ▶ **Electronics Division** — RF parts (antennas, dielectric filters, isolators) plus finished devices (e-cigarette hardware, wearables, ESL). 9.7% of sales, and falling.

The business model is **high-volume, low-margin component supply to set-makers**, anchored on Samsung Electronics smartphones, with a fast-growing automotive-camera leg supplied through Hyundai Mobis and HL Klemove. Production is concentrated offshore — Vietnam (Partron Vina, the primary volume base) and China (Yantai) — for cost, while R&D and pilot lines sit in Korea. Demand is order-driven on short-lead purchase orders with **no meaningful backlog**, and pricing erodes ~3–5% per quarter structurally, so the model lives on yield, vertical integration and customer/application diversification DART 20260311004362.

Exhibit 2 · Customer concentration: Samsung 71%, Hyundai Mobis 12%, everyone else 17%




■ Samsung Electronics	71.2
₩960.3bn — mobile camera / sensor	
■ Hyundai Mobis	11.5
₩155.5bn — automotive camera (+54% YoY)	
■ All other (~150 accounts)	17.3
₩233.7bn — incl. HL Klemove, KT&G	

Source: DART 20260311004362, segment note (Customer A = Samsung ₩960.3bn; Customer B = Hyundai Mobis ₩155.5bn). ~150 accounts in total.

The camera-isation of the franchise

The structural shift inside the revenue line is that Partron is becoming a **camera-module company**. The Optomechanical Division rose from 58.3% of sales in FY2023 to 67.0% in FY2025, while the Sensor and Electronics divisions shrank in share ^{DART 20260311004362}. That concentration is double-edged: it lifts Partron's exposure to the highest-volume part it makes, but also to the customer (Samsung) and the cycle (handsets) that drive it.

Exhibit 3 · Division mix, FY2023–FY2025: the optical (camera) leg now two-thirds of revenue



Source: DART 20260311004362, divisional revenue (₩100mn ÷10 → Wbn). Optomechanical 58.3% → 66.7% → 67.0% of total.

Geographically the franchise is export-led: FY2025 export revenue was ₩1,032.9bn against ₩316.6bn domestic – roughly 77% export – with the "Vietnam" line (₩758.6bn) reflecting shipment-to and billing-through Samsung's Vietnam handset assembly rather than Vietnamese end-demand ^{DART 20260311004362}. That export skew makes the model a beneficiary of a weak Korean won and a casualty of a strong one – a macro variable that runs straight to the margin line.

WHY THIS MATTERS FOR DILIGENCE

Value Partron as **two businesses inside one P&L**: a large, mature, Samsung-indexed cash leg (mobile camera + sensors + RF, ~84% of revenue) whose job is to fund the dividend and the buyback; and a small, growing, higher-stickiness automotive-camera leg (~16%) that is the only structural growth vector. The diligence question is not the health of the engine today – it is whether the second leg can scale fast enough to matter before the next handset down-cycle, and what the family's succession agenda does to the capital that funds it.

2 Five-Year Business Trajectory

THE NUMBERS

Five years of Partron's income statement tell a single story: **cyclical, Samsung-handset-driven revenue that does not secularly grow**, married to a margin that has only compressed. Revenue ranged ₩1,172bn–₩1,486bn across FY2021–FY2025 with *zero net growth* — ₩1,312.7bn then, ₩1,349.5bn now — and the operating margin fell from 6.0% to a five-year-low 3.3%

DART 20260311004362.

Exhibit 4 · The five-year P&L walk, FY2021–FY2025 (consolidated, ₩bn)


Metric (₩bn, CFS)	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	1,312.7	1,221.9	1,172.4	1,486.4	1,349.5
Operating profit	78.7	56.8	41.7	61.7	44.7
OP margin	6.0%	4.6%	3.6%	4.2%	3.3%
Net income (owners)	72.5	38.5	28.8	53.4	33.7
Total equity	480.5	501.1	505.7	555.5	560.3
Total liabilities	199.5	184.6	145.7	187.8	214.9
Operating cash flow	164.1	67.5	93.7	99.3	54.2
Capex (PP&E + intang.)	57.2	57.8	39.6	37.5	42.7

Three features matter for diligence. First, the balance sheet is **conservative and net-cash in posture** — FY2025 equity of ₩560.3bn against ₩214.9bn of liabilities — which is exactly why management can return capital while earnings fall (the cash is not needed for growth capex; capex runs a steady ₩37–58bn/year). Second, R&D has held at ~3% of sales throughout (₩43.8bn in FY2025), neither starved nor scaled. Third, FY2025 operating cash flow of ₩54.2bn is the weakest of the five years — a working-capital and margin squeeze that frames the timing of the buyback as a deliberate signal, not a flush-of-cash reflex.

The product-line divergence

Underneath the flat top line, the product mix is pulling apart. In FY2025 mobile-phone parts fell **-14.5%** to ₩737.7bn, e-cigarette devices fell **-34.6%** to ₩73.3bn, and "other parts" were roughly flat — while automotive parts rose **+24.8%** to ₩209.4bn, the single growing product line in the company DART 20260311004362, segment note 35. This is the chart that defines the franchise: the cash leg shrinking, the growth leg compounding, and the net of the two going sideways.

Exhibit 5 · Product-line revenue, FY2024 → FY2025: mobile and e-cig down, only automotive up



Source: DART 20260311004362, segment note 35. Mobile -14.5%, automotive +24.8%, e-cigarette devices -34.6%, other parts -4.4%.

The e-cigarette line deserves a flag: it is a device-ODM business for KT&G's "lil" heated-tobacco platform, and its -34.6% fall is idiosyncratic to KT&G's launch cycle and intensifying competition in that supply chain, not a read on the category. It is a lumpy, single-customer line, and a recurring source of volatility in the Electronics division.


THE STRUCTURAL READ

Partron's revenue has not grown in five years because its largest leg — Samsung mobile camera modules — is in **secular share-give** (Samsung in-sources flagship optics; rivals win mid-range allocation), while the one leg that is growing is still only ~16% of sales. The company is not shrinking and it is not growing; it is **re-mixing**, and the pace of that re-mix is the whole operating question.

The Q1-2026 inflection — does the trough end?

The five-year decline broke sharply in early 2026. **Q1-2026 revenue was ₩451.0bn, up +37.5% YoY** from ₩328.1bn, operating profit roughly doubled to ₩12.3bn, and the operating margin recovered to 2.7% — a quarterly run-rate well above the FY2025 level if sustained DART 20260515001472. The mechanism is operating leverage: camera-module capacity utilisation had fallen to 29.6% (from 55.6% two years earlier) and fingerprint-sensor utilisation to 22.4%, so a volume recovery drops disproportionately to margin without fresh capex.

Exhibit 6 · Idle capacity is the operating-leverage engine: camera-module utilisation fell to ~30%



Source: DART 20260311004362, parent-basis capacity/output disclosure. Camera modules 55.6% → 32.1% → 29.6%; fingerprint sensors 22.4% (FY2025).

The crucial qualification: the rebound is driven by the **handset cycle**, not the diversification story. Sell-side coverage attributes the turn to Samsung smartphone share gains plus expanded high-megapixel camera-module supply, and projects a recovery *back to the FY2024 peak* rather than a structural breakout Daishin, 2026-02-11; iM Securities, 2026-02-26. The inflection therefore funds and de-risks the buyback (more cash, cheaper to retire shorts) but does not yet prove the strategic pivot. The structural question — whether the automotive and sensor legs can carry growth when the next handset down-cycle arrives — remains open.

DO NOT OVER-READ ONE QUARTER

Q1-2026 is a cyclical snap-back off a depressed base, on the very Samsung dependence the Value-Up plan claims to be escaping. It is genuine operating leverage, not a re-rating of the business model. The trough may be ending; the bifurcation is not.

3 Products & Segment Economics

Partron runs six product legs of very different quality. The core is a large, commoditising mobile-camera business; the defensible moats are narrower — a majority share of Samsung's optical fingerprint modules and a newly-won automotive-camera Tier-1 slot — and the rest is option value. The unifying constraint is that Partron is a **module integrator** that does not own the highest-value layers of its own products, which caps the margin on all of them.

1 · Mobile camera modules — the core, in secular share-give

Compact camera modules for Samsung smartphones are roughly half of group revenue. Partron assembles the lens barrel, voice-coil-motor actuator, OIS, image-sensor packaging and FPCB into a drop-in unit, and makes the actuators, lenses and motors in-house — vertical integration is the cost/yield lever in a business where ASPs erode 3–5% per quarter ^{DART 20260311004362}. But Samsung has been **vertically integrating camera modules in-house**, expanding Samsung Electro-Mechanics, which pushed Partron off the next-gen foldable rear-camera supply and down to a tertiary slot on the S-series in the ~2023 cycle — suppliers removed from a stabilised foldable chain find re-entry "extremely difficult" ^{TheElec idxno 18702}.

2 · Optical fingerprint (FOD) — the clearest moat

Partron's most defensible product is its **majority share — over 50% — of Samsung Galaxy's optical fingerprint-on-display sensor modules**, versus MCNEX ~30% and Dreamtech ~20% ^{TheElec idxno 2351 / 905}. Optical FOD debuted on the 2019 Galaxy A-series and is the volume mid-range standard while Samsung reserves ultrasonic for top flagships. With disclosed capacity of 144M units/year at just 22.4% utilisation, this leg carries both a real share moat and substantial volume headroom.

3 · Automotive ADAS cameras — the growth leg

Automotive camera modules are the structural thesis. They are ruggedised, AEC-Q-qualified imaging units for ADAS (surround-view, rear-view, e-mirror) and in-cabin driver-monitoring, built to longer qualification and multi-year program life than phones, and carrying roughly **~\$25/unit versus ~\$10 for a smartphone module** — higher ASP, lower churn ^{TheElec idxno 11600}. Partron supplies Hyundai Mobis and HL Klemove, has design wins on the Genesis GV60 (around-view since 2021) and a planned GV90 infrared driver-monitoring camera with Mobis, and **entered the Hyundai Mobis vehicle-camera Tier-1 slot in H2-2025**, vacated when MCNEX moved to direct-OEM supply ^{TheElec idxno 3470 / 11600}. The result: automotive parts +24.8% to ₩209.4bn and Hyundai Mobis revenue +54% to ₩155.5bn in FY2025.

DO NOT MIS-CITE THE BACKLOG AS REVENUE

A data-discipline flag worth stating plainly. Several Korean articles cite a Partron automotive figure of "₩1.98tn." That is the company's **cumulative five-year automotive order backlog** (reportedly ₩700bn in 2022 rising to ₩1.5tn), *not* annual revenue. The DART segment note puts **annual** automotive-parts revenue at ₩209.4bn. The ₩1.98tn figure must never be cited as a revenue line.

4 · Health / bio sensors — the option

Partron shipped the **world-first miniature infrared temperature sensor in the Galaxy Watch5 (2022)**, alongside optical heart-rate sensors and wearable ODM builds ^{DART 20260311004362; ET News}. This is the highest-CAGR served market Partron touches (wearable health sensors ~16.5%/yr) but the lowest current weight — a thin sliver of the ₩315bn Sensor & Package line. It is an option on Samsung continuing to source externally, not yet a P&L mover.

5-6 · RF / antenna / UWB and finished devices

The Electronics division spans antennas, dielectric filters and isolators (the low-value passive end of RF, not the PA/filter-IC end held by Qorvo/Murata), a UWB-module adjacency where Partron is a listed Qualcomm UWB partner, and finished devices — e-cigarette hardware for KT&G and electronic shelf labels through the stand-alone Partron ESL subsidiaries. These are minor, ASP-eroding or lumpy lines; the division fell to 9.7% of sales in FY2025.

Moat scorecard by product leg

Ranking the six legs by defensibility separates the franchise's durable moats from its commodity volume. Only two legs — optical fingerprint and the automotive ramp — are genuinely hard to displace; the large camera core is strategically eroding, and the device legs are weak.

Exhibit 7 · Product-leg moat scorecard

Product leg	Moat	Basis	Key fragility
Optical fingerprint (FOD)	High	>50% share of Samsung Galaxy optical FOD modules	Tied to A-series volume; ultrasonic reserved for flagships
Automotive ADAS camera	Med-rising	Hyundai Mobis Tier-1 slot (2025); GV60/GV90 wins; DMS regulation pull	Low volume, thin near-term margin; MCNEX/Sekonix/Semco
Mobile camera modules	Medium	Samsung incumbency + in-house optical vertical integration	Samsung in-sourcing; pushed off foldable/flagship-top tiers
Health / bio sensors	Medium	World-first IR temp sensor (Galaxy Watch5); HRM + ODM	Small base (<10% of sales); Samsung-dependent
RF / antenna / UWB	Medium	Leading domestic RF parts; Qualcomm UWB partner; chip-antenna IP	Commoditising; low-value passive end; minor % of sales
Devices (e-cig / ESL)	Low-Med	KT&G "li" ODM; ESL global sales footprint	E-cig -34.6% FY2025; ESL sub-scale vs VusionGroup/Pricer

The intellectual-property base is mid-tier and consistent with that scorecard: **166 patents** (160 domestic, 6 overseas), 49 trademarks, plus chip-antenna IP including USPTO 11,316,250 DART 20260311004362. It is enough to assemble capable modules up to 100MP, but not enough to own the lens, the flagship zoom or the image sensor — which is why the structural margin ceiling sits where it does.

WHERE THE DURABLE VALUE SITS

The two hard-to-displace moats are **(a) the majority share of Samsung's optical fingerprint modules** and **(b) the newly-won Hyundai Mobis automotive-camera Tier-1 position with a regulatory (driver-monitoring) tailwind** — the latter the only structurally growing leg. The large camera core is the cash engine, but it is the part most exposed to Samsung's in-sourcing. A buyer is underwriting two small moats and one big, eroding annuity.

New-business pipeline — option value, not yet revenue

Partron is pushing into adjacencies that leverage its sensor, automotive and RF base: tire-pressure monitoring (TPMS) sensors, silicon-carbide (SiC) power modules for EV power electronics, non-invasive glucose meters extending the Galaxy-Watch health competence, and 5G-Advanced/6G repeater modules Komachine; Business Post. Each is directionally sensible and on-strategy. None has a disclosed revenue line in the DART filings — they are roadmap-stage, and should be treated as **option value, not a forecastable contribution**.

DILIGENCE FLAG — UNVERIFIED ROADMAP LINES

SiC power modules, UWB/RFID modules and glucose meters are repeatedly cited in management framing and trade press as growth vectors, but carry **no disclosed sales** in the collected filings. They support the narrative of diversification; they do not yet support a number. Any forward model should size them as zero in the base case and as optionality in the bull.

The Samsung supply-chain anchor — a 2026 reinforcement

One recent event sharpens the incumbency picture. In June 2026, a **Korea Eximbank-Samsung-Partron tripartite MOU** named Partron as Samsung's **flagship Vietnam supply-chain partner** for renewable-power joint procurement across roughly eleven Samsung Vietnam suppliers Korea Eximbank / Samsung MOU, Jun 2026. It does not move near-term revenue, but it is a signal that Samsung continues to treat Partron as a strategic anchor inside its offshore manufacturing cluster — relationship capital that is real, even as the 71% concentration it reflects is the core vulnerability.

A recovery, not a liability, in litigation


Partron is the **plaintiff** in a Seoul Central District Court action against FTI / Franklin Wireless, alleging FTI induced Partron to procure semiconductor components — including via Partron's Qualcomm account under NDA — for FTI 5G products, then failed to buy them; the claim was adjusted to ≈US\$8.9m in January 2026 EDGAR 0001683168-26-001067. This is recovery upside, not a liability — but it is a window into Partron's RF/Qualcomm relationships and worth confirming in diligence.

4 Served Markets & 5-Year Forecast

WHERE PARTRON PLAYS

Partron sits in seven end-markets — six of them sized below, with the seventh (e-cigarette device ODM) carried in the Exhibit 9 table where its served-market read belongs — and the signal is the **dispersion, not the blend**. Roughly 56% of revenue is concentrated in the two slow-to-steady camera markets (mobile decelerating, automotive steady), while the fastest-growing served markets it touches — wearable-health sensors, electronic shelf labels, UWB — carry the least revenue weight today. The blended weighted-average served-market growth is ~6–8% NRG estimate; the operating story is mix-shift within that band, not riding one high-CAGR wave.

Exhibit 8 · Served-market sizing: base year → 2030 across six of Partron's end-markets (USD bn)



Sources: Yole (auto camera), Mordor (camera module, wearable health), Grand View, MarketsandMarkets, IMARC, IndustryArc. Mobile-only slice and ESL midpoint are NRG estimates. Research-firm ranges are wide; midpoints shown. The seventh leg, e-cigarette device ODM, has no clean standalone market size (only consumable-led retail figures are sourced) and is carried in Exhibit 9 instead.

Two markets dominate Partron's exposure and pull in opposite directions, so the next two pages take each in turn — the large, decelerating mobile-camera market where Partron is *losing* share, and the steady automotive-camera market where it is *gaining* share several times faster than the market grows.

Mobile camera module — large, decelerating, Partron losing share

The total camera-module market is roughly **USD 41–48bn (2024/25)**, of which the mobile/consumer slice is ~USD 26–27bn

NRG estimate from Mordor consumer share. It grew historically on content, not units — the multi-camera explosion from single to triple/quad arrays — because smartphone units were roughly flat, recovering only to ~1.24bn in 2024 ^{IDC}. Forward estimates diverge widely, from 4.2% (Mordor) to 10.4% (Grand View); an NRG base of ~5–7% reflects mix/content growth against a low-single-digit unit market.

The decisive fact is relative: Partron's mobile-parts revenue fell **–14.5% in FY2025 while the market grew low-to-mid single digits** — Partron is *losing share*, or de-emphasising commodity mobile, as Samsung in-sources flagship and Partron pivots its 29.6%-utilised camera capacity toward automotive. Korea is ~18% of the global camera-module market, led by Samsung Electro-Mechanics and LG Innotek; Partron is a mid-tier volume assembler within that, not a share-gainer.

THE MOBILE READ

Mobile camera is Partron's **cash leg in secular share-give, not its growth leg**. It funds the dividend and the buyback; it does not drive the equity story forward. The forecast question for this leg is how gently it declines, not how fast it grows.

Fingerprint, RF and the device markets — tracking, not beating

The fingerprint-sensor market (~USD 4–8bn, forward 7–14%, ultrasonic the fast-grower) and the RF front-end market (~USD 25.6bn, ~10–11%, but Partron at the low-value antenna end) are markets Partron tracks rather than beats — its served slices grow nearer the handset-content rate than the headline. The e-cigarette device market's 30–60% headline CAGRs are **consumable-led, not the device-ODM slice** Partron serves, which is lumpy and KT&G-dependent.

Automotive camera module — steady market, Partron gaining 3–4× the rate

The automotive camera-module market is the cleanest growth read in Partron's set: **~USD 6bn (2024) → USD 8.7bn (2030) at 6.6% revenue / 8.1% unit CAGR, with >400m units by 2030** Yole, via Electronics Weekly. Volume outgrows value as cameras proliferate and per-unit prices fall — favourable to a volume module assembler like Partron. The structural drivers are hard: cameras-per-car rising from ~2–3 to 8–12 on L2+/L3 autonomy, and a **regulatory pull** as the EU General Safety Regulation makes driver-monitoring mandatory on new vehicles from July 2024 (full enforcement 2026); the driver-monitoring market alone is forecast at USD 3.03bn (2024) → 8.10bn (2033) at 11.7% Grand View.

Against a ~6.6% market, Partron's automotive parts grew **+24.8%** in FY2025 — gaining share roughly 3–4× the market rate off a low base, with 70%+ idle module capacity to absorb the ramp at high incremental margin. This is the structural thesis in one line: **a share-gainer in a steady-grower, off a low base, with the spare capacity to scale it cheaply.**

THE AUTOMOTIVE READ

This is the only leg where market growth and Partron's share gain compound in the same direction. The diligence test is durability: can Partron hold and extend the Hyundai Mobis Tier-1 slot against MCNEX (whose auto leg grew +69.6% to ₩180.2bn, faster still) and Sekonix, and convert idle capacity into multi-year program wins before the qualification window closes?

The fastest-growing markets carry the least weight

The wearable-health-sensor market (16.5%, Mordor), the ESL market (~14%) and UWB (16–20%) are the highest-CAGR markets Partron touches — and the smallest by revenue weight. That is the dispersion problem: Partron's growth markets are real but immaterial, and its material markets are slow. The blend resolves to ~6–8%, but the equity outcome depends on whether the small fast legs scale before the large slow leg drags.

The blended served-market read

Weighting each market's forward growth by Partron's FY2025 revenue exposure makes the dispersion explicit. The two camera markets carry ~56% of the weight at modest growth; the high-CAGR markets carry almost none.

Exhibit 9 · Served markets, Partron weight, forward growth and direction-vs-Partron

Served market	Partron weight	Forward CAGR (sourced)	Direction vs Partron
Mobile camera module	~40%	~5-7% (mix-led) [est]	below — share-give (-14.5%)
Automotive camera module	~16%	6.6% rev / 8.1% unit (Yole)	far above — +24.8%
Fingerprint sensor	part of 23%	7-14%	at market
Wearable health sensor	small	16.5% (Mordor)	at/above (thin base)
RF front-end (+UWB)	part of 10%	10-11% (UWB 16-20%)	below — passive end
E-cigarette device ODM	~5%	device slice mid-single-digit	below — -34.6%
Electronic shelf label	small (subs)	~14% [mid]	at market
Blended weighted average	100%	~6-8% [NRG est.]	mix-shift, not a wave

Two cross-cutting forces shape the 2026–2030 demand environment. A **weak-won tailwind** on ~77% export revenue lifts reported margin when the currency cooperates; and **deep idle capacity** means the next up-cycle drops to margin without heavy capex — the operating-leverage mechanic that was visible in Q1-2026. The hardest regulatory pull in Partron's set is the EU driver-monitoring mandate; the hardest headwind is vaping/nicotine regulation on the e-cig leg.

ESTIMATE DISCIPLINE

Research-firm forecasts for these markets diverge widely (camera-module forward CAGR alone spans 4.2%–10.4%). All carve-outs and the blended figure are labelled NRG estimates derived from sourced numbers and Partron's FY2025 mix; they are presented as ranges, not false precision.

5 Competitive Landscape & Positioning


Partron does not have a single peer set; it fights in **three distinct arenas**, and its position differs sharply in each. The global optics giants (LG Innotek, Sunny Optical, Largan) are not in its served pool — they supply Apple and the Android-global market — and matter only as the benchmark ceiling. The real fight is inside Samsung's camera-module pool and the Korean automotive-camera pool, and the defining fact of FY2025 happened there.

Exhibit 10 · Three competitive arenas, by share of Partron revenue

Arena	% of rev	Partron's role	Who it fights
A · Samsung mobile camera	~45%	#2-#3 of 3-4 approved external vendors	Samsung Electro-Mech. (in-house #1), MCNEX, Cammsys, Powerlogics
B · Korean automotive ADAS camera	~16%	Tier-2 module maker into Mobis / HL Klemove	MCNEX, Sekonix, LGIT-auto; Tier-1 houses above (Valeo/Magna/Bosch)
C · Sensors / RF-antenna / devices	~33%	Niche specialist	Samsung Electro-Mech. (antenna/filter), Amotech; Qorvo/NXP upstream

The scale picture is stark. Partron at ₩1,349.5bn and MCNEX at ₩1,279.2bn are the only true apples-to-apples pair — same Samsung-mobile and Korean-auto pool, same ~₩1.2-1.3tn scale, same Vietnam cost base. Everyone else is either an order of magnitude larger on a different customer (Samsung Electro-Mechanics at ₩11.3tn group, ~8× Partron, with ~₩3.8tn of camera modules alone), a layer up or down the stack (Largan's lens-sets), or sub-scale (Cammsys, Powerlogics).

Exhibit 11 · FY2025 revenue across the Samsung-pool and Korean-auto cohort (₩bn)




Sources: DART (Partron); company IR / Korean press (MCNEX, Semco, Cammsys, Powerlogics). Samsung Electro-Mechanics bar is group revenue, clipped to scale; its camera unit alone (~₩3.8tn) is ~3× Partron.

The defining competitive fact: the MCNEX crossover

In the same year Partron's revenue fell -9.2% , its nearest twin **MCNEX grew $+21.0\%$** to ₩1,279.2bn, with operating profit up $+17.2\%$ to ₩52.0bn

Korean press; Daishin. And in **Q1-2025, MCNEX overtook Partron on quarterly revenue for the first time in five years** — ₩347.9bn versus ₩328.1bn — while the profit gap blew out (MCNEX operating profit $+38\%$ to ₩20.9bn against Partron -61% to ₩6.3bn) ^{TheElec idxno 35751}. The cause was allocation: Samsung diversified actuator orders after Jahwa entered Apple's chain, and rebalanced mid-range Galaxy volume toward MCNEX, deliberately, to keep no single vendor dominant.

Exhibit 12 · The crossover: MCNEX passed Partron on quarterly revenue in Q1-2025 (₩bn)



Sources: TheElec idxno 35751 (Q1-2025 MCNEX ₩347.9bn vs Partron ₩328.1bn); DART 20260515001472 (Partron Q1-2026 ₩451.0bn, $+37.5\%$ YoY). MCNEX Q1-2026 not directly comparable; shown for Q1-2025 only.

MCNEX's automotive leg also out-grew Partron's, at ₩180.2bn and **$+69.6\%$** versus Partron's $+24.8\%$ — same customer logic (Hyundai/Kia, Mobis), growing faster. The read is unambiguous: **MCNEX is the proof that Partron's Samsung allocation is contestable, not owned**. Allocation can shift overnight, and in FY2025 it shifted away from Partron. The Q1-2026 rebound shows the allocation can swing back when Samsung's mid-range shipments surge — but the standing warning is that Partron does not control the variable that drives half its revenue.


THE COMPETITIVE WARNING

Partron and MCNEX are twins fighting for the same Samsung wallet; in FY2025 the wallet moved toward MCNEX. The most important competitor question in diligence is not "can Partron beat Samsung Electro-Mechanics" (it cannot — Semco is the captive #1) but "can Partron hold its share against MCNEX," a peer of equal scale and cost, currently with the better allocation momentum.

Positioning — value-chain capture against customer diversification

Mapping the cohort on two axes — value-chain position and margin capture (horizontal) against customer scale and diversification (vertical) — places Partron and MCNEX in the centre, both mid-scale Samsung-anchored module assemblers trying to climb the margin axis via automotive ADAS and (for Partron) biometric/health sensors. The IP owners and global-volume players (Largan, Sunny, LG Innotek) sit top-right; captive Samsung Electro-Mechanics sits high but Samsung-locked; the sub-scale Samsung-dependents (Cammsys, Powerlogics) sit bottom-left.

Exhibit 13 · Two-axis positioning: where Partron sits among the module cohort



NRG analysis from §3/§5 of the competitive factbase. Axes are qualitative composites; bubble area approximates relative revenue scale. Illustrative, not to scale.

The nuance between the twins: **MCNEX is slightly ahead on the vertical axis** (faster automotive growth, better Samsung allocation momentum), while **Partron is slightly ahead on horizontal breadth** (the sensor/health + RF + ESL diversification is the widest in the Korean mid-cap module cohort) but behind on current execution. Partron's diversification is the genuine differentiator — the sensor and automotive legs are harder to second-source than commodity mobile modules — but breadth has not yet converted into either growth or margin.

Peer scorecard

Exhibit 14 · Like-for-like peer comparison (FY2025, served-segment focus)

Company	Listing	FY2025 rev	YoY	Key customer	Position vs Partron
Partron	KOSDAQ 091700	₩1,349.5bn	-9.2%	Samsung 71% / Mobis 12%	subject
MCNEX	KOSDAQ 097520	₩1,279.2bn	+21.0%	Samsung + Hyundai/Kia	closest rival; ahead on momentum
Samsung Electro- Mech.	KRX 009150	₩11.3tn	record	Samsung (captive) + global	in-house #1; ~8× scale
Cammsys	KOSDAQ 050110	~₩0.45tn	+rev/ -profit	Samsung	below Partron; loss- making
Powerlogics	KOSDAQ 047310	~₩0.40tn	-6.7%	Samsung	smaller, partial overlap
LG Innotek	KRX 011070	₩21.9tn	+3.3%	Apple 70–83%	Apple-mirror; ceiling, not rival
Sunny Optical	HKEX 2382	RMB 43.2bn	+12.9%	Android / auto	global #1; benchmark

COMPETITIVE VERDICT

Partron is a defensible **#2-class Samsung-ecosystem module + sensor specialist**, structurally below the optics-IP owners and currently out-run by its nearest twin (MCNEX) inside their shared Samsung pool. Its credible offsets are the automotive ADAS ramp via Hyundai Mobis / HL Klemove and the harder-to-displace biometric/health-sensor franchise; its breadth is the widest in the Korean mid-cap cohort. It will not become a global module champion — it is capped as a domestic-Samsung-anchored mid-cap — but within that ceiling it is a genuine, diversified survivor. The live competitive risk is share-loss to MCNEX; the structural one is Samsung's in-sourcing.

6 The Strategic Signal

CAPITAL RETURN AS SUCCESSION ENGINE

The dominant strategic signal at Partron is not an operating one — it is a **capital-allocation one**. Management published a formal five-year Corporate Value-Up Plan in December 2024 and has executed it ahead of schedule, returning capital aggressively *into* the worst margin year in five. Read at face value it is a textbook shareholder-friendly program. Read skeptically — and this is the report's most important finding — it is also a **founder-succession and control-consolidation instrument**, and the two motives are inseparable.

What actually happened — the capital-return chronology

This was not a one-off buyback. Across 2024 Partron accumulated treasury stock in five tranches to 8.441M shares (14.33% of stock); disclosed a ₩30.6bn Value-Up Plan in December 2024; and then ran **two cancellations and a capital reduction** that pulled issued shares from 57.0M to 50.0M

DART 20260225004109; KIND; IB Tomato.

Exhibit 15 · The capital-return chronology: accumulate, plan, cancel, cancel, reduce

DART + KIND filings




Sources: DART 20260225004109 (capital reduction); KIND voluntary disclosure 20251208000313 (cancellation #2); IB Tomato / FETV / Bloter (Value-Up Plan, cancellation #1, accumulation).

The 5.0-million-share capital reduction decided in February 2026 was an **acceleration** — management collapsed a multi-year cancellation schedule into a single early batch, explicitly to align with government guidelines and to hit the sub-50-million-share target a year ahead of plan. The KRX listed-share step-downs (57M → 55M on 2025-12-30 → 50M on 2026-05-13) reconcile cleanly to these DART events; there is no unexplained dilution or contraction in the tape.

The share-count ladder — and the stated policy

The mechanical result is a share count grinding steadily lower, each step matched to a disclosed capital event.

Exhibit 16 · Listed-share step-down ladder: 57.0M → 55.0M → 50.0M, each tied to a DART event




Sources: DART 20260311004362 (FY2024-end 57.0M; FY2025 2.0M cancellation → 55.0M); DART 20260225004109 (5.0M reduction → 50.0M, re-listing 2026-05-13). Cross-checked against KRX universe.csv listed-share step-downs.

The stated policy is explicit and unusually aggressive for a Korean mid-cap: cancel **≥3% of shares per year, 2024–2028**, to push issued shares below 50 million; pay cash dividends of ~3% of market capitalisation annually; and target a payout ratio ≥40%. FY2025 delivered a 45.5% payout, a DPS of ₩310 and a cash-dividend yield of ~4.3% — and the cancellation plus dividend together is marketed as a "**≥6% annual shareholder-value enhancement**"

DART 20260311004362; FETV; IB Tomato.

Exhibit 17 · Dividend trajectory: DPS ₩267 → ₩310 and a defended ~4% yield



Source: DART 20260311004362. DPS FY2023 ~₩267 → FY2024 ₩300 → FY2025 ₩310; cash-dividend yield 3.0% → 4.0% → 4.3% (RHS); consolidated payout 45.9% / 28.3% / 45.5%.

Returning capital aggressively while earnings fall is itself a signal: management is telling the market the cash is **not needed for growth capex** (capex is a steady ₩37–43bn/year against a net-cash balance sheet) and that the equity is mispriced — at a reported ~0.7× 2026 price-to-book, a buyback is value-accretive by construction *Daishin*.

The motive nobody puts in the IR deck: succession and control

Cancelling treasury stock **mechanically lifts family voting power without buying a share** — the denominator shrinks. For Partron that arithmetic runs straight into a looming generational transfer, and the two are inseparable.

- ▶ Founder and Chairman **Kim Jong-gu is 76** (born November 1949; 29 years at Samsung Electronics / Samsung Electro-Mechanics before founding Partron in 2003). His direct stake is **16.89%** on the FY2025 denominator DART 20260311004362.
- ▶ The family bloc controls roughly 26% (Kim plus spouse Park Myung-ae at 4.90% plus nine relatives), and the treasury-holding entity held a further ~10–13% before the latest reduction DART 20260311004362; Governance Watch.
- ▶ **Succession is unresolved and urgent.** Co-CEO son Kim Won-geun (46, co-CEO since March 2023) holds only **~1.9%** — barely above his uninvolved sister — against a potential **inheritance-tax exposure exceeding ₩440bn** if he inherits both parents' stakes Governance Watch.
- ▶ Since the 2006 IPO (when Kim held 9.52%) he has reportedly spent ₩229bn to lift his stake +6.78pp, has bought treasury personally as "responsibility management," and has reportedly **rejected private-equity buyout approaches** to protect control Governance Watch; Business Post.

THE SKEPTICAL READ — ALIGNED, NOT ALTRUISTIC

A cancelled treasury share is genuinely pro-minority: real EPS and voting accretion, not a parking lot for friendly votes. But for Partron the *same act* tightens the founder family's grip toward ~30% control ahead of the inheritance event — so "Value-Up" and "lock in control before the transfer" point in the same direction. Investors get a real ~6%/year return; the family gets ~30% control and a cleaner cap table to pass down. The program is durable **precisely because** the controlling family's incentive reinforces it — which is exactly why it is the most credible part of the equity story.

The other half of the signal — diversification, real but distant

The Value-Up deck pairs the capital return with a **₩2.2tn-revenue-by-2028 target**, premised on cutting Samsung dependence by scaling automotive/EV sensing, UWB/RFID, health-bio sensing and ESL. The traction is real but narrow: automotive parts grew +24.8% to ₩209.4bn (the only growing line), and the cumulative five-year automotive order backlog reportedly climbed from ₩700bn (2022) to ₩1.5tn ^{The Bell}.

But the destination is distant. Reaching ₩2.2tn by 2028 from ₩1,349.5bn in FY2025 requires **~18% CAGR for three years** — faster than the ~13% the deck implies off the FY2023 base, and far above a five-year history of zero net growth. The math depends on a Samsung-handset re-acceleration *plus* automotive compounding, not automotive alone — and Samsung was still 71.2% of FY2025 revenue with the top-two at ~83%. Diversification has barely dented concentration. The target should be read as **aspirational**, not a base case.

THE INTERNAL CONTRADICTION

The ₩2.2tn target implicitly needs the very Samsung-handset tailwind the plan claims to be escaping. The diversification narrative is directionally true in automotive and option-rich elsewhere (SiC, UWB, glucose, ESL — none yet a disclosed revenue line), but it is not, on the disclosed numbers, on a path to ₩2.2tn by 2028 without a handset cycle doing much of the work.

The market overlay — contextual only


For completeness, and as a sentiment overlay rather than a driver: KRX short-interest as a share of float rose to a ~2.0% peak in mid-2025 and then fell steadily to near zero by mid-2026 — a covering-into-strength pattern coinciding with the Q1-2026 inflection and the buyback, consistent with, but not the cause of, the operating turn ^{KRX short_balance.csv}.

7 Outlook & Scenarios 2026–2030

THREE PATHS

The forward view turns on three variables: the Samsung handset cycle (which drives the cash leg), the pace of the automotive-camera ramp (the only structural growth), and the continuation of the buyback-and-cancel program (the most durable element). The scenarios below are **illustrative analytical constructs on a business basis – not forecasts of record, and explicitly not a valuation.**

Exhibit 18 · Revenue scenarios 2026–2030: base recovers to the FY2024 peak; only the bull approaches the ₩2.2tn target



NRG scenario model, illustrative. Base = handset recovery + steady auto; bull = sustained Samsung share-gain + auto compounding (approaches but does not reach the ₩2.2tn-2028 company target); bear = handset down-cycle, auto carries little. Not a forecast.

The base case is the sell-side consensus shape: FY2026 revenue recovering toward the FY2024 peak (~₩1,486bn) on the handset cycle, then low-single-digit compounding as automotive scales against a slowly-declining mobile leg. It does *not* reach ₩2.2tn by 2028 — that outcome lives only in the bull, and only with a sustained Samsung share-gain doing much of the work.

The three paths, with explicit assumptions

Bull

~₩2.3tn by 2030

Assumes: Samsung sustains mid-range share-gains and lifts Partron's in-customer share; automotive compounds >20%/yr as the Mobis Tier-1 slot broadens into DMS/SVM programs; idle capacity converts to margin. Approaches — but on this model still falls short of — the company's ₩2.2tn-by-2028 target. Margin recovers toward 5%+.

Base

~₩1.76tn by 2030

Assumes: FY2026 recovers to the FY2024 peak on the handset cycle, then low-single-digit growth as automotive (+15-20%) offsets a gently-declining mobile leg. Concentration persists near 70% Samsung. Margin stays in the 3-4% band. The buyback continues, shares keep grinding below 50M.

Bear

~₩1.24tn by 2030

Assumes: a handset down-cycle plus continued share-loss to MCNEX; automotive grows but is too small to offset; e-cig stays weak. Revenue drifts below the five-year floor. The capital-return program continues regardless — the family-succession incentive holds it in place even as operations disappoint.

The asymmetry worth noting: the **capital-return program runs in all three scenarios**. It is the one element insulated from the operating outcome, because it is anchored to the founder's succession agenda rather than to earnings. That is why a diligence reader should treat the buyback-and-cancel as the base-rate expectation and the operating transformation as the variable.

THE FORWARD READ

The most likely 2026-2030 path is a cyclical recovery to the old peak, a continued slow re-mix toward automotive, and a relentless share-count grind — **not** a structural breakout to ₩2.2tn. The single most likely corporate catalyst is not an automotive win but a **succession or ownership transaction**, for which the treasury cancellations are visible pre-positioning.

8 Risk Register

WHAT TO UNDERWRITE

The risks cluster into three families: **concentration and competition** (the core), **structural margin** (the ceiling), and **ownership and succession** (the catalyst). On the evidence none is disqualifying, but each is diligenceable and several are pricing factors.

Exhibit 19 · Risk register – seven risks, three families

Risk	Severity	Evidence	Diligence / mitigant
Customer concentration	High	Samsung 71.2% / top-2 ~83%; equity is a levered call on the Galaxy cycle	Stress-test a handset down-cycle; track Samsung in-sourcing of modules
Share-loss to MCNEX	High	MCNEX +21% vs Partron -9% FY2025; Q1-2025 quarterly crossover	Monitor Samsung allocation by model; auto Tier-1 slot durability
Structural margin cap	Med-High	Module integrator; owns no lens/zoom/sensor IP; 3.3% OPM; ASP -3-5%/qtr	Test whether automotive/sensor mix lifts the ceiling at all
Diversification distant	Med-High	₩2.2tn-2028 implies ~18% CAGR vs zero 5-yr history; needs handset tailwind	Treat target as aspirational; size SiC/UWB/glucose as option, not base
Succession / ownership overhang	Med-High	Founder 76; heir ~1.9%; >₩440bn inheritance-tax exposure	The most likely catalyst is a succession transaction – map the structure
E-cig volatility	Med	-34.6% FY2025; single-customer (KT&G) launch-cycle dependence	Carry as lumpy; vaping/nicotine regulation headwind
Cyclicality + FX	Med	~77% export; KRW strength is a direct margin headwind	Hedging policy; weak-won upside is real but not controllable

The encouraging structural point: the **net-cash balance sheet and the disciplined capital-return program are the shock absorbers**. Partron can fund the dividend, the buyback and the automotive ramp from operating cash through a down-cycle without leverage – which is why the operating risks, while real, are survivable. The risk that the balance sheet cannot absorb is the *ownership* one.

The succession situation — the dominant non-operational variable

An acquirer or partner is not stepping into a clean management succession; it is stepping into an **unresolved generational transfer under a tax overhang**, run by a founder who has signalled he will resist external control. The facts, all from filings and primary press:

- ▶ The founder is 76 and controls, with family, ~26% directly plus a treasury bloc; the heir holds ~1.9% and would face a **>₩440bn inheritance-tax bill** on a full transfer DART 20260311004362; Governance Watch.
- ▶ The treasury cancellations **lift family control toward ~30% without a purchase** — visible pre-positioning for the transfer, and the clearest reading of why the program is accelerated.
- ▶ The founder has **reportedly rejected PE buyout approaches** to protect control — his stated red line — which constrains the universe of feasible ownership transactions Business Post.
- ▶ No 5%-holder, tender-offer or activist filing appears in the collected DART set — the program is **management-initiated, not activist-forced**, distinct from many 2024–25 Korean Value-Up cases DART set; data gap.

WHAT A COUNTERPARTY INHERITS

A founder-controlled, succession-driven cap table where the dominant 2026–2030 catalyst is most likely a **gift, holding-company restructuring or other family transfer** — not a sale to an outside party, which the founder has resisted. The capital-return program is durable but it is also a control mechanism; any counterparty should map the succession structure, the tax mechanics and the founder's red lines as the first workstream, ahead of the operating diligence.

FINAL WORD

Partron is a structurally sound, net-cash, diversified Samsung-ecosystem module maker whose business is neither growing nor failing — it is re-mixing, slowly, while being financially re-rated and dynastically re-positioned. The financials settle that the engine is durable. The deal turns on two things a counterparty must price directly: whether the **automotive leg scales before the next handset down-cycle**, and how the **founder's succession** resolves the control of the cash flows underneath.

Working With Nathan Research

COMPLIANT EXPERT NETWORK

Filings and press establish the *shape* of this business; they do not capture the operating detail that decides a deal — the real state of Samsung allocation, the durability of the Hyundai Mobis Tier-1 slot, the texture of the founder's succession plans. That detail lives with the people who built, sold, specified, sourced and competed with these products — and reaching them, compliantly, is what Nathan Research does.

Nathan Research Group operates **Korea's first dedicated expert-network service, established in 2013**. We were built for the global private-equity, hedge-fund or corporate-strategy team that has a thesis on a Korean asset and needs primary, on-the-ground diligence that public disclosure cannot supply. The Korean components, camera-module and automotive-electronics complex is one of our deepest benches.

Who we put in the room

For a Partron or camera-and-sensor module engagement, we source, vet and convene primary experts across the value chain:

- ▶ **Former executives & founders** — from Partron and its domestic peers (MCNEX, Cammsys, Powerlogics, Semco)
- ▶ **Module & sensor engineers** — camera-module, actuator, optical fingerprint and automotive-camera design
- ▶ **Samsung & Hyundai-ecosystem buyers** — component sourcing, vendor-allocation and qualification specialists
- ▶ **Automotive Tier-1 & OEM contacts** — Hyundai Mobis, HL Klemove and ADAS-program perspectives
- ▶ **Supply-chain & offshore-manufacturing experts** — the Vietnam (Partron Vina) and China cost base
- ▶ **Governance & M&A specialists** — Korean succession, inheritance-tax and control-structure advisers

How an engagement works

1 • Scope

We translate your thesis into a precise expert profile and question set, mapped to the diligence decisions you need to close.

2 • Source & vet

We identify, screen and compliance-clear each expert — confirming relevance, recency and the absence of conflicts before any call.

3 • Convene & synthesize

We arrange interviews on your timeline and, where useful, deliver written synthesis tied back to the questions in this brief.

THE QUESTIONS THIS BRIEF LEAVES OPEN — AND WE CAN HELP CLOSE

Samsung allocation — how vendor share is really set by model, and whether Partron can recover what MCNEX took. **Automotive durability** — whether the Hyundai Mobis Tier-1 slot broadens into multi-year DMS/SVM programs. **Succession & control** — how the founder's transfer is structured and how counterparties read the red line on PE. None is answerable from filings alone; all are diligence-able with the right primary voices.

Partner With Nathan Research

START THE CONVERSATION

If your team is evaluating **Partron**, the **Korean camera-and-sensor module sector**, or the broader **Samsung and Hyundai components supply chain**, we would welcome the conversation. Tell us the decision you are trying to make – we will tell you, candidly, whether and how our network can help you make it.

What to expect when you reach out: A direct reply from a partner, not an intake form – and a scoping conversation rather than a sales call. From there: a compliant, conflict-cleared expert panel assembled to your timeline, and, where useful, written synthesis that builds directly on the analysis in this monograph.

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A Appendix

SOURCES · METHODOLOGY · GLOSSARY

Evidence base & methodology

This monograph synthesizes a full inventory of primary and secondary sources, assembled and cross-checked on 2026-06-16. Figures are cited inline to source; where independent sources disagreed (notably market sizing), ranges are presented with attribution rather than single-vendor point estimates. All "[NRG estimate]" items are analyst derivations from sourced figures plus Partron's FY2025 mix, not independently sourced numbers.

Regulatory (DART, primary): Annual Report FY2025 (rcept 20260311004362, filed 2026-03-11) + 5-yr structured consolidated financials (fnlftSinglAcntAll CFS); Quarterly Report Q1-2026 (20260515001472, 2026-05-15); H1-2025 (20250814003566) and Q3-2025 (20251114001830); capital reduction decision (20260225004109, 2026-02-25); treasury-acquisition decision (20250805000286) and results (20250702000378, 20251001000526); AGM notice (20260304000990).

Market (KRX): by_company/partron OHLCV, short_balance, short_volume, universe (1-yr panel, 2025-05-23 → 2026-06-15; KRX OpenAPI sto/* + data.krx.co.kr, SHA256-verified manifests) — used only as a demand/sentiment overlay, never as a valuation input.

Peers (SEC EDGAR): Franklin Wireless 10-Q (accession 0001683168-26-001067, 2026-02-17), re the Partron-as-plaintiff FTI litigation.

Sell-side & trade press: iM Securities (2026-02-26), Daishin (2026-02-11, 2025-08/11); THE ELEC (idxno 2351 / 905 / 11600 / 18702 / 3470 / 12357 / 35751); Business Post, Governance Watch, Bloter, FETV, IB Tomato, The Bell, Edaily — used for unit economics, the MCNEX crossover, capital-return chronology and succession context; sell-side target prices treated only as third-party sentiment, never as a valuation conclusion.

Web market research (adversarially verified): camera-module, automotive-camera, fingerprint, wearable-health, RFFE/UWB, heated-tobacco and ESL market sizing from Yole, Grand View, Mordor, Maximize, MarketsandMarkets, IDC, IMARC, IndustryArc and others — each headline figure cross-checked; single-source or contradicted figures presented as ranges.

Note on data gaps: consolidated group headcount is not disclosed (only the 544 parent figure); FY2021/FY2022 R&D is on a different basis to FY2023–25; no 5%-holder / activist filings were in the collected DART set; the "₩1.98tn" automotive figure is a cumulative order backlog, not revenue (annual auto-parts revenue is ₩209.4bn); SiC / UWB / glucose-meter revenue is roadmap-stage with no disclosed line. These are flagged at each point of use.

Glossary

CCM — compact camera module (lens + actuator + image-sensor package). **FOD** — fingerprint-on-display (optical under-display sensor module). **ADAS / DMS / SVM** — advanced driver-assistance systems / driver-monitoring system / surround-view monitor. **ASP** — average selling price. **OPM** — operating margin. **Value-Up** — Korea's corporate value-enhancement program (기업가치 제고 계획). **감자 (gamja)** — capital reduction (here via treasury-stock cancellation). **전장 (jeonjang)** — automotive electronics. **Optomechanical (광메카)** — Partron's camera / optical division. **DART** — Korea's electronic disclosure system; **rcept_no** — a filing's receipt number. **KRX** — Korea Exchange.

SCOPE & DISCLAIMER

This is a business-analysis and market-research document prepared to support due-diligence; it is **not** investment advice, not a solicitation, and contains no price target or valuation conclusion. Sell-side targets, where mentioned, are third-party sentiment only. Forward scenarios are illustrative analytical constructs, not forecasts of record. Prepared by Nathan Research Group, Seoul, 2026-06-16.